Africa Briefing N°27
23 June 2005
Peace may yet be possible in Northern Uganda in 2005. Many elements seem to be in place, but they need to be pursued by President Museveni’s government in a more comprehensive framework, given stronger international support and — most urgently — be committed to by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the context of a specific process with a clearly definable endgame.
The outlines of rebel demands are clearer, the government has expressed flexibility, and the LRA military position is becoming more tenuous. However, there has not yet been tangible progress. The unanswered question is whether Joseph Kony, the unpredictable insurgent leader, is truly nearing a strategic decision that his prospects and those of his supporters are better served by a deal or whether he is merely playing for time in order to regroup as he has done several times previously. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is expected to issue arrest warrants for Kony and senior deputies shortly, which will put new pressure on all concerned, including the government and its authorised mediator, Betty Bigombe, to decide whether they will continue with the effort at negotiation. Patience is wearing thin on all sides.
The mediation has been pursued in recent months against a backdrop of continuing LRA atrocities directed at Acholi civilians. The LRA remains focused on terror tactics, not the control of territory. Even with gradually eroding force levels, it still can wreak havoc with spectacularly brutal strikes, which prevent resettlement of the 1.5 million displaced persons and give the appearance the government is not in firm control of the North.
Leaving the decision on peace or war solely in the hands of the brutal Kony would be irresponsible on the part of the government and the international community. Much more can be done now not only to support the potential the talks seem to retain in the wake of recent gestures by Kony to meet with Bigombe, but also to prepare the ground for sustainable peace and reconciliation in Northern Uganda as a society. The government, in cooperation with the concerned international community, should construct and implement a comprehensive strategy for peace including the following elements:
-
a more ambitious mediation strategy, including preparation of detailed proposals to have the LRA sign up to a ceasefire, security guarantees, and a more expansive program for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into society (DDR);
-
a military strategy that maximises civilian protection and the ability of the army to prevent further attacks and abductions, in the context of a more sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy that does a better job of respecting human rights and avoiding abuses that cost the government dearly in terms of civilian support in the North;
-
a more robust reintegration strategy that begins immediately and seeks to do a better job with all ex-LRA combatants in order to accelerate the return of those who remain in the bush, including through guarantees of education and micro-enterprise support;
-
a justice and accountability strategy that involves better understanding by the government of the ICC’s independent responsibilities and objectives while striving to take into account the related objectives of peace and reconciliation;
-
a better coordinated reconciliation strategy that provides more direct support for initiatives and processes such as community-based efforts already being led by women’s and victims’ groups, that would accelerate the acceptance of LRA ex-combatants back into local communities and facilitate the restoration of intercommunal links that have been damaged by nearly two decades of war;
-
a more concerted hearts and minds strategy that features visible efforts to improve governance in the North, strengthen the humanitarian safety net in the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and include Northern Ugandans in planning and preparing for eventual normalisation of life in their region; and
-
pressure on the Sudanese government, which has substantially sustained the LRA for a decade, to play a more assertive role in bringing the rebellion to a close — including by taking steps to arrest Kony or expel him from southern Sudan if he will not negotiate seriously.
Kampala/Brussels, 23 June 2005
After some 18 years of uninterrupted rule by President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda now faces a historic political test. It has to demonstrate that it has created the necessary institutions of government for a smooth power transfer from President Museveni and from non-party movement politics to multi-party democracy in 2006.
Indeed in March 2003, the NRM declared it was freeing up political parties and that by 2006 Uganda would have returned to multi-party democracy. Presently however, there is total lack of consensus across society on the political future of the country. Instead, there is growing tension over what is seen as the NRM’s attempt to amend the Constitution to allow Museveni seek another term without any limit, effectively making him a life President of Uganda. A crisis of governance which could degenerate into direct conflict clearly has to be prevented in Uganda. The unending armed rebellions against the NRM and the restrictive legislation on freedom of association and speech equally needs stronger attention.
The Ugandan government confirmed in 2004 that it would seek a military solution while remaining open to a negotiated end to the 18-year conflict with Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels in northern Uganda. The government claims the LRA has entered its death throes.
Nevertheless, at the turn of 2004/2005, both tracks – peace talks combined with a limited government ceasefire offered in November and December 2004 and an enhanced military operation in Uganda and southern Sudan – are yet to yield a lasting solution. The people of the north have had no respite from violence for two generations.
Meanwhile, concern has grown at the increasing autocratic tendencies of government in the run-up to the anticipated transition from the current no-party system to a multi-party system in 2006. Crisis Group reporting focuses on containing, preventing and ultimately resolving these issues in Uganda.
Our reports on Uganda are listed below, starting with the most recent. You can also search for relevant reports using the search box in the top right hand side of this page.
|
Head of State: President Yoweri Museveni, January 1986– (first elected 1996, re-elected 2001) Uganda gained independence from Britain 1962 and experienced nearly ten years of multiparty democracy albeit under increasingly authoritarian President Milton Obote. Obote ousted 1971 by non-commissioned army officer Idi Amin to initial widespread enthusiasm. Amin, who expelled Uganda’s South Asian mercantile class to create economic opportunity for Ugandan Africans, grew increasingly brutal and erratic. He was ultimately overthrown 1979 by Tanzanian-backed rebellion including current President Museveni. When Museveni failed to win presidency in 1981 elections widely viewed as rigged, he began bush war against reinstated Obote leading to victory of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) January 1986 and installation of “no-party” government system. Uganda, in 1997 alliance with neighbouring Rwanda, backed rebellion to oust Zaire’s (see Democratic Republic of Congo) President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 alliance. During 1998-2002 war, Uganda and Rwanda fought three major battles over control of resources in eastern Congo. Museveni and NRM co-opted many former Ugandan rebel groups, but Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), claiming to represent interests of marginalised Acholi people in northern Uganda, continued anti-government fight. Eighteen year war with LRA, characterised by abduction of children and teenagers to serve as soldiers or concubines, has resulted in displacement of nearly one million in northern Uganda and thousands of deaths. LRA supported by neighbouring Sudan, where LRA leaders have base, in retaliation for Uganda’s support of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebel movement in southern Sudan. Negotiations to end Sudan’s 21-year civil war led to lessening of tensions between Uganda and Sudan 2003, which allowed Ugandan army troops to pursue LRA into Sudan. Mid-2004 army enjoyed series of successes against LRA, and number of senior rebel commanders took advantage of amnesty to desert. Uganda faces presidential elections in 2006. updated 22 September 2004 |
|
 |
|
| For more information from International Crisis Group go to: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm | |
|
|
 |
|
